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Footnotes
1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
2. Id. at 1477.
3. Id. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion of the court,
joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsberg, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito concurred, joined by Justice
Roberts, and Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 1477, 1487, 1494.
4. Id. at 1477–78.
5. Id. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482,
483 (Ky. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
A noncitizen charged with a criminal offense faces adual risk of serious consequences: in addition to thesentence that could be imposed as a result of his crim-
inal conviction, a noncitizen defendant may also face severe
immigration consequences, including removal from the United
States, if he is convicted of a crime. We recommend that trial
court judges advise noncitizen defendants of the potential
immigration consequences of their criminal convictions so
that immigrants are fully informed of their rights. In section I,
we first explain the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that attorneys must advise their
clients of the immigration consequences of their convictions.
We demonstrate that trial court judges have a similar duty to
advise noncitizen defendants because they have always played
a role in ensuring effective assistance of counsel and ensuring
knowing and voluntary pleas.
In section II, we summarize the areas of immigration law in
which a criminal conviction or the sentence imposed by a trial
court judge can have serious implications for noncitizens. In
section III, we examine the various approaches currently
taken by states that have imposed a statutory duty on judges
to advise noncitizens about the immigration consequences of
their convictions. Based on an analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of these statutory advisements, we present a
model judicial advisement in section IV that ensures a non-
immigrant defendant receives adequate advice and is fully
informed about the potential immigration consequences of a
criminal conviction.
I. TRIAL COURT JUDGES’ DUTY TO UPHOLD 
DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS INCLUDES PROTECTING THE
RIGHT TO ACCURATE, INFORMED IMMIGRATION
INFORMATION
In this section, we examine the role of trial court judges when
noncitizen criminal defendants appear before them. This section
starts by addressing the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which created affirmative obliga-
tions for defense attorneys to advise their clients regarding the
immigration consequences of criminal convictions. Next, we
demonstrate that trial court judges have a similar duty based on
their preexisting duties to ensure effective assistance of counsel
and to ensure guilty pleas are knowing and voluntary.
A. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: IMMIGRANT DEFENDANTS
HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW ABOUT POTENTIAL
REMOVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
The United States Supreme Court decision in Padilla v. Ken-
tucky clarified defense counsel’s obligations with respect to
immigration advice but left open the question of judges’ roles
in ensuring noncitizen defendants understand the immigration
consequences of their criminal convictions. We recommend
that judges should also play a role in advising immigrants of
the consequences of their criminal convictions based on
judges’ preexisting obligations to protect the due-process
rights of criminal defendants.
1. Padilla v. Kentucky: Facts and Holding
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided Padilla v.
Kentucky, which held that criminal defense attorneys are
required to advise their clients of the potential immigration
consequences of their guilty pleas.1 Jose Padilla was a lawful
permanent resident and native of Honduras who had been
legally present in the United States for 40 years.2 Mr. Padilla
was also a veteran of the Vietnam War, a fact the Supreme
Court noted in the first paragraph of its opinion.3 Mr. Padilla
was charged with transporting a large quantity of marijuana in
his trailer and pled guilty on the basis of his attorney’s erro-
neous advice.4 His attorney advised him to plead guilty
because the attorney believed that Mr. Padilla “did not have to
worry about immigration status since he had been in the coun-
try so long.”5 This advice was, unfortunately, incorrect. The
federal Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) dictates that
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6. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien who at any time after admis-
sion has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation
of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a con-
trolled substance, other than a single offense involving possession
for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is
deportable.”).
7. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
8. Id.
9. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 455 (1970).
10. Id.
11. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
12. Id. at 1482. 
13. Id. at 1479–80.
14. Id. at 1480.
15. Id. at 1486 (“[W]e now hold that counsel must inform her client
whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding
Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a
consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of
deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no
less.”).
16. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
17. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. (“This is not a hard case in which to
find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be
determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was
presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was incor-
rect.”).
18. Id. at 1484.
19. See IMMIGRANT DEFENSE PROJECT & NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS AFTER
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 12 (2011) [hereinafter JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS],
available at http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/05/postpadillaFINALnew.pdf.
20. Another issue left open by the Court and later resolved was
whether Padilla would apply to incorrect immigration advice
given before 2010. See infra Section I.B.2.
21. Id. at 1483; see also INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i).
22. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
23. Id.
24. Id. The Court explained that it was attempting to strike a balance
between the necessary nature of immigration advice and the com-
plexity of immigration law. See id. at n.10 (“Lack of clarity in the
law . . . does not obviate the need for counsel to say something
about the possibility of deportation, even though it will affect the
scope and nature of counsel’s advice.”).
an alien who is convicted of a controlled-substance violation is
automatically subject to removal.6
As a result of his conviction following his guilty plea, Mr.
Padilla was placed in removal proceedings. He raised a post-
conviction challenge to his criminal conviction, alleging that
his attorney’s incorrect advice amounted to ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.7 The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied Mr.
Padilla’s claim without a hearing, holding that removal was a
mere “collateral consequence” of a criminal conviction and
therefore did not fall under the purview of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s effective-assistance doctrine.8 Under the collateral-con-
sequences doctrine, a defendant must make a plea with full
knowledge of the direct consequences of his conviction in order
to satisfy due process.9 If a defendant makes a plea and is
unaware of the collateral consequences, however, the plea still
withstands constitutional scrutiny.10 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court held that effective assistance of counsel
requires an attorney to advise her client whether a criminal con-
viction carries a risk of removal.11 The Court held that the col-
lateral-consequences doctrine did not apply to severe immigra-
tion consequences, such as removal from the United States.
Instead, the Court summarily concluded that the Sixth Amend-
ment itself requires affirmative immigration advice.12
The Court referenced recent changes in immigration law,
noting that the system had evolved from one that allowed trial
court judges to influence which convictions would result in
removal to one that requires automatic removal as the result of
many criminal convictions.13 The Court stated that these
“changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the
stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”14 In light of these
serious consequences, the Court concluded that counsel’s fail-
ure to provide immigration advice could constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.15
The test for ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in
a 1984 United States Supreme Court case, Strickland v. Wash-
ington. Strickland states that for a defendant to prove he
received ineffective assistance of counsel, he must prove first
that his counsel’s performance was deficient, and second, that
but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the case
would have been different.16 In the specific context of Mr.
Padilla’s case, the Court concluded under Strickland’s first
prong that counsel’s performance was deficient. The Court
stated that the consequence of automatic removal resulting
from a conviction of transporting marijuana was clear from the
plain text of the immigration statute and that counsel was
therefore deficient for failing to advise his client of that fact.17
With regard to Strickland’s second prong, the court remanded to
the lower Kentucky courts to determine whether Mr. Padilla
would not have pled guilty but for his counsel’s erroneous state-
ment that he would suffer no immigration consequences.18
2. What Padilla Requires from Attorneys
Before Padilla, state courts and the United States Courts of
Appeals had split on the issue of whether defense counsel had
a duty to advise his client of the immigration consequences of
a guilty plea or conviction.19 Despite attempting to standardize
and clarify defense counsel’s duty with respect to immigration
advice, the Padilla opinion did not address how specific
defense counsel’s advice must be.20
Under the specific facts of Padilla, the Court stated that Mr.
Padilla’s attorney should have advised him that a guilty plea
would have resulted in removal because the immigration
statute at issue was clear that any controlled-substance viola-
tion triggered automatic removability.21 The Court was less
forceful, however, in declaring the type of advice that would be
required in other scenarios.22 Acknowledging that immigration
law is “complex” and “a legal specialty of its own,” the Court
opined that when the immigration consequences of a convic-
tion were less certain than in Mr. Padilla’s case, a defense attor-
ney would not be required to provide a detailed warning on the
specific immigration consequences.23 Instead, in those scenar-
ios, “a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise
a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a
risk of adverse immigration consequences.”24
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25. Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1484.
28. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29. See id.
30. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
31. See generally id.
32. See infra Section II.A.
33. While this duty may arise more commonly on appeal when a
defendant raises an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, many
commentators agree that judges nevertheless have a duty to
ensure effective assistance during trial-level proceedings to the
extent possible. See JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 19, at 16
(“From the inception of a criminal process, judges have a general
duty to be attentive to the quality of defense counsel.”).
34. See Steven Weller and John A. Martin, Implications of Padilla v.
Kentucky on the Duties of State Court Criminal Judges 5-6 (work
in progress), http://www.sji.gov/PDF/Implications_of_Padilla_
for_State_Court_Judges.pdf (hypothesizing that in addition to
judicial concerns for attorney competence in appointing counsel
for indigent defendants, Padilla might also be implicated when
judges select attorneys for inclusion in an indigent defense pool or
select private counsel to represent defendants pro bono).
35. See ABA, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 6.1 (2012)
(designating attorney-client communications as confidential).
36. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (setting
forth the “actual imprisonment” standard for appointment of
counsel in misdemeanor cases).
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but disagreed that
defense attorneys should have an affirmative duty to provide
immigration advice.25 Rather, he stated his belief that counsel
should either refrain from giving any immigration advice at all
or provide noncitizen clients with a general warning of poten-
tial immigration consequences while encouraging them to
consult an immigration attorney for specific advice.26 The
majority opinion rejected this approach, citing the “absurd”
effect it would have of incentivizing attorneys to remain silent
on immigration matters, even where accurate and rudimentary
immigration advice was readily available.27 The majority’s
rejection of Justice Alito’s approach demonstrates the Court’s
concern that noncitizens receive accurate and informed advice
and militates in favor of judicial advisements in addition to
those provided by attorneys.
Padilla makes clear that although defense attorneys are not
expected to become immigration-law experts, they are
expected to research the relevant immigration statutes and
apply settled caselaw when giving their clients immigration
advice. In contrast to this affirmative duty on attorneys, the
Court did not explicitly address the role of trial court judges in
advising noncitizen defendants. The next section explains why
trial court judges should also take steps to uphold noncitizens’
rights.
B. WHY PADILLA REQUIRES TRIAL COURT JUDGES TO
ENSURE NONCITIZEN DEFENDANTS ARE
INFORMED ABOUT THE IMMIGRATION 
CONSEQUENCES OF A CONVICTION
The Padilla opinion was clear with respect to the fact that
defense attorneys have an affirmative duty to provide immi-
gration advice, even though it is not entirely certain how spe-
cific this advice must be. For judges presiding over criminal
prosecutions of noncitizens, however, the implications of
Padilla were less explicit. This section will examine judges’
preexisting duties to protect defendants’ rights. We conclude
that these preexisting duties, combined with the Court’s con-
cern for noncitizen defendants as expressed in Padilla, require
trial court judges to take steps to protect noncitizen defen-
dants, including advising them of their rights and the risk of
removal.
1. Trial Court Judges’ Preexisting Duty to Ensure 
Effective Assistance of Counsel Includes the Right to
Accurate Immigration Advice
In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the right to the effective assistance of counsel for all
criminal defendants.28 Strickland set a high bar for criminal
defendants attempting to allege their trial counsel was ineffec-
tive.29 In the context of a plea, Strickland requires a showing
that the defendant would have chosen to proceed to trial rather
than pleading guilty, but for his counsel’s deficient advice.30
The trial judge is responsible for ensuring that criminal
defendants receive due process of law, including verifying that
a defendant is aware of all her Sixth Amendment rights and
that counsel is performing effectively.31 Appellate judges see
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal appeals.
Now, under Padilla, the Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel includes accurate advice on the removal consequences
of a criminal conviction,32 meaning that trial and appellate
judges must also be concerned about whether counsel is com-
plying with this new requirement.33
This concern for a noncitizen defendant’s right to accurate
immigration advice may arise in a number of different scenar-
ios. For example, trial court judges need to consider defense
counsel’s ability to provide immigration advice when appoint-
ing counsel to an indigent defendant who faces immigration
consequences as the result of a conviction.34 Furthermore, even
for non-appointed counsel, an attorney’s general ability to pro-
vide competent immigration advice is an important aspect of
the Sixth Amendment following the Padilla decision. We rec-
ommend that judges ensure defense counsel’s ability to provide
accurate immigration advice by asking the attorney whether he
feels he can properly advise his client on the immigration con-
sequences of a conviction. Trial court judges cannot inquire
into the exact nature of immigration advice an attorney gives
his client, however, because of attorney–client confidentiality.35
Furthermore, the Padilla mandate presents a special con-
cern for noncitizen defendants who are not entitled to an
appointed attorney. The United States Supreme Court has
determined which indigent defendants are entitled to an
appointed attorney in a set of three cases, Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, Scott v. Illinois, and Alabama v. Shelton.36 These cases state
that an indigent criminal defendant charged with a misde-
meanor is not entitled to appointed counsel if he does not
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37. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 662.
38. See also Weller & Martin, supra note 34, at 6 (recognizing the spe-
cial challenges presented by unrepresented defendants who face
immigration consequences).
39. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
40. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
41. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1111.
42. Many states had rules in place before Padilla that required trial
court judges to ensure defendants understood the immigration
consequences of their pleas. See infra Section III.B.
43. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1112–13.
44. Id. at 1114 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1115 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1116 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Our application of Strick-
land in Padilla followed naturally from these earlier observations
about changes in immigration law and the accompanying evolu-
tion of professional norms.”).
47. Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422 (2013).
48. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 2011).
49. Sylvain, 466 Mass. at 423.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Sylvain, 466 Mass. at 423–24.
53. Id. at 434 (“[B]ased on our authority to conduct an independent
review, ‘[we] are not required to blindly follow [the Supreme
Court’s] view of what constitutes a new rule.’”) (quoting Rhoades
v. State, 233 P.3d 61 (Idaho 2010)).
54. Id. at 435.
55. Id. at 436 (“For the same reasons that we determined that the
Sixth Amendment right enunciated in Padilla was not a ‘new’ rule,
we conclude that the defendant’s coextensive right under art. 12
[of the Massachusetts Constitution] does not constitute a ‘new’
rule.”).
56. See Christopher N. Lasch, Mass. High Court Breathes New Life into
Padilla in Commonwealth v. Sylvain, CRIMMIGRATION BLOG,
http://crimmigration.com/2013/09/16/mass-high-court-breathes-
new-life-into-padilla-in-commonwealth-v-sylvain/ (Sept. 16,
2013, 4:00 A.M.). Professor Lasch authored an amicus brief in the
Sylvain case on behalf of Massachusetts Legal Academics. 
57. Brief of Amici Curiae, Ramirez v. State, No. 33,604 (New Mexico
Supreme Court).
58. People v. Baret, 952 N.Y.S.2d 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
receive jail time for his sentence.37 The United States Supreme
Court has not addressed what happens when an indigent crim-
inal defendant is charged with a non-jailable offense that may
nevertheless lead to his removal.38 Given the Padilla Court’s
concern for noncitizens, we recommend that trial court judges
err on the side of protecting noncitizens’ rights by appointing
counsel to indigent defendants charged with non-jailable
offenses that carry the risk of removal.
2. When Defendants Can Challenge Inaccurate 
Immigration Advice Given Before Padilla
At the time Padilla was decided, it was not clear whether it
applied to pre-2010 criminal convictions. Lower courts split
on the issue of whether Padilla should have retroactive effect,
but in a 2013 case, Chaidez v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court clarified that it read Padilla to apply only
prospectively.39 The Court applied the test of retroactivity set
forth in Teague v. Lane. The Teague retroactivity test states that
new rules of criminal procedure apply prospectively, while
mere clarifications of existing law are given retroactive effect.40
The Court concluded that Padilla announced a new rule
because the Padilla Court first had to determine whether
immigration advice even fell within the ambit of the Sixth
Amendment.41 The Court stated that Padilla was the first time
that a court had recognized counsel’s affirmative duty to pro-
vide accurate immigration advice, despite the fact that many
states already required trial courts to ensure counsel had
advised his client on the immigration consequences of a plea.42
The Court held that Padilla did not have retroactive effect
based on its conclusion that requiring defense attorneys to
advise their clients on immigration matters was a new rule.43
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg authored a strong dissent
in Chaidez, asserting that Padilla “did nothing more than apply
the existing rule of Strickland” to the new scenario of defective
immigration advice.44 The dissent cited other cases in which
Strickland’s application to new factual situations did not trigger
prospective-only application45 and noted that professional
norms regarding immigration advice had evolved with the
changing stakes of immigration law to require accurate immi-
gration advice even before the Padilla decision.46
Despite the majority opinion in Chaidez declining to
retroactively apply Padilla, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has decided to give Padilla retroactive effect
within Massachusetts.47 Before the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling in Chaidez, the Massachusetts high court had
decided that Padilla should have retroactive effect.48 After the
Chaidez decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed that it would continue to apply Padilla retroactively
by deciding Commonwealth v. Sylvain.49 In Sylvain, the defen-
dant pled guilty in 2007 to a drug charge based on his attor-
ney’s erroneous advice that he would not be removed as a con-
sequence.50 The issue in Sylvain was whether the defendant
should be permitted to bring a Padilla claim despite the fact his
conviction predated the Padilla decision.51 The Massachusetts
high court affirmed its prior decision and re-stated that Padilla
should apply retroactively despite the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling to the contrary in Chaidez.52 The court relied on
its ability to independently apply the Teague framework in
determining whether a constitutional criminal-procedure rule
should have retroactive effect or not.53 Under its independent
application of Teague, the Massachusetts court sided with the
Chaidez dissent in concluding that Padilla did not announce a
new rule of criminal procedure and therefore had retroactive
effect.54 The court also held that the Massachusetts constitu-
tion independently required accurate immigration advice and
that Padilla therefore did not announce a new rule under either
the federal or state constitutions.55
The Sylvain decision opened up the possibility that other
state courts might choose to apply Padilla retroactively in spite
of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Chaidez.56 For
example, the New Mexico Supreme Court recently permitted
the New Mexico Legal Academics and the National Immigra-
tion Project of the National Lawyers Guild to file an amicus
brief on the question of Padilla retroactivity.57 A Padilla-
retroactivity case is also pending in New York.58
The United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Padilla and
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59. People v. Diaz, 3 N.E.3d 617 (N.Y. 2013).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
61. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (requiring the court to conduct a
colloquy before acceptance of a guilty plea); IOWA R. CRIM. P.
2.8(2)(b) (same).
62. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).
63. Id. at 1482 (“The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-
suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk
of deportation.”).
64. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 455 (1970) (“A plea of guilty
entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences . . . must
stand.”) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.
1957)).
65. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 55 (1985) (affirming defendant’s
conviction and holding that parole eligibility is a mere collateral
consequence of a guilty plea of which defendant need not be
informed).
66. See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v.
Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 41 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 87, 96–98 (2011) (explaining that punishment for a crime is
a direct consequence, but civil consequences such as license revo-
cation are collateral).
67. See JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 19, at 12.
68. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
69. Id. at 1486.
the divergent approaches to retroactivity taken by the nation’s
high court and state courts leave this an area of flux. It is pos-
sible that in the coming months and years, other states will fol-
low Massachusetts’s lead and elect to apply Padilla retroac-
tively under either an independent application of Teague or on
state constitutional grounds. We recommend that trial court
judges ensure noncitizen defendants’ rights are protected in all
future cases to avoid unnecessary appeals implicating Padilla.
3. Trial Court Judges Must Ensure Noncitizen 
Defendants Are Aware of the Immigration 
Consequences of Pleading Guilty
Trial court judges presiding over criminal proceedings will
frequently encounter noncitizen defendants who want to enter
a plea of guilty rather than proceeding to trial. Due process and
many state and federal rules of criminal procedure place an
affirmative duty on judges to ensure that guilty pleas are made
knowingly and voluntarily. After Padilla, the trial court should
verify that a defendant is aware of the immigration conse-
quences of a conviction before allowing the defendant to enter
a guilty plea. For example, the New York Court of Appeals
recently decided People v. Diaz, which held that as a matter of
due process, the trial court is required to advise a noncitizen
defendant that a criminal conviction may result in removal
from the United States.59 We recommend that all trial court
judges follow New York’s lead and ensure noncitizen defen-
dants are fully informed before pleading guilty.
a. Basic Principles of Due-Process Fairness Require
Advising Defendants of Potential Immigration 
Consequences of Pleading Guilty
The Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments
require that no defendant be deprived of life or liberty without
due process of law.60 For trial judges, this means ensuring that
criminal defendants are aware that pleading guilty to a crime
constitutes a waiver of certain rights and that defendants
undertake such a waiver with full knowledge of its conse-
quences. Rules of criminal procedure in various jurisdictions
may also require certain safeguards to protect a defendant’s
rights during a plea proceeding.61 Padilla itself was silent on
whether its holding extended to require trial judges to deter-
mine a defendant’s awareness of immigration consequences
before accepting a guilty plea. However, the Padilla Court
emphasized the severity of removal as a consequence of a crim-
inal conviction and placed an affirmative duty on defense
counsel to advise a criminal defendant on immigration conse-
quences before the defendant accepts a plea.62 Padilla’s impli-
cations for trial judges during a plea colloquy are complicated
by the Court’s refusal to classify immigration consequences as
either collateral or direct, but given the Court’s acknowledg-
ment that immigration advice is essential information and that
removal is a serious consequence, we recommend that judges
ensure defendants are aware of the immigration consequences
of their guilty pleas.63
b. Trial Court Judges Should Advise Defendants of the Risk
of Removal, Despite the Padilla Court’s Unwillingness to
Label Removal a “Direct Consequence” of a Criminal
Conviction
Courts have struggled to determine what information due
process requires a defendant to know and understand before
entering a guilty plea. In Brady v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court determined that a defendant must make
a guilty plea with a full understanding of the direct conse-
quences of his plea.64 In Hill v. Lockhart, the Court clarified
that a plea made without full understanding of the collateral
consequences could nevertheless be voluntary, as long as the
direct consequences of the plea were made clear.65 This collat-
eral/direct distinction led courts to debate what qualifies as a
direct, as opposed to collateral, consequence of a criminal con-
viction.66 Before Padilla, a number of state courts and United
States Courts of Appeals had applied the collateral-conse-
quences doctrine to the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea and concluded that immigration consequences were col-
lateral.67
Padilla itself did not explicitly state whether immigration
consequences fell under the ambit of due process required
when courts accept guilty pleas. Rather than declaring that
immigration consequences are direct consequences of a guilty
plea, the Court declined to apply the direct/collateral frame-
work at all.68 Although the court did not define removal as a
“direct” consequence, it nevertheless acknowledged the sever-
ity of removal and the importance of accurate immigration
advice.69 We recommend, therefore, that trial court judges
ensure defendants are aware of the immigration consequences
of their convictions before accepting guilty pleas. 
For trial court judges to be able to assess whether defense
counsel has given accurate immigration advice and defendants
are well-informed when accepting a plea, an understanding of
some aspects of immigration law is necessary. The next section
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70. See IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (1965).
71. INA § 101(a)(48)(A).
72. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2003).
73. CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES, A BENCH GUIDE FOR STATE TRIAL
COURT JUDGES ON THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF STATE COURT
CRIMINAL ACTIONS 9 (2009), available at http://www.sji.gov/
PDF/Criminal_Bench_Guide_on_Immigration_Consequences.pdf
[hereinafter BENCH GUIDE].
74. INA § 240B.
75. INA § 237(a)(2).
76. In re V-Z-S-, 22 I. & N. 1338, Interim Decision 3434 (BIA 2000)
(citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)).
77. INA § 101(a)(48)(B).
78. Id.
79. See INA § 101(a)(43)(J), (T).
80. See, e.g., INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (“is convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after
the date of admission.”).
81. See, e.g., INA § 101(a)(43)(D) (“if the amount of funds exceeded
$10,000.”).
82. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i).
83. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii).
84. INA § 237(a)(2)(C).
85. INA § 237(a)(2)(D).
turns to the relevant portions of the INA that might be impli-
cated when a trial court convicts and sentences a noncitizen
defendant.
II. FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW DEFINING THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
The federal Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) imposes
statutory consequences for immigrants that have been con-
victed of certain crimes.70 Only an immigration judge may
issue a removal order, but this section illustrates the extent to
which a sentence from a criminal proceeding could have the
added effect of removal from the United States in an immigra-
tion context. This additional consequence makes immigration
concerns very important for criminal sentencing by trial court
judges.
A. OVERVIEW OF A NONCITIZEN’S REMOVAL BY 
IMMIGRATION COURT POST CRIMINAL 
CONVICTION
Immigrants who have been convicted of certain qualifying
crimes are removable from the United States by U.S. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE). An immigrant must be
convicted of the crime in order to be found removable by an
immigration judge: a conviction includes all formal judgments
of guilt entered by a court as well as all suspended sentences
following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or where the
defendant has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilt.71 Upon conviction, an individual immigrant will gener-
ally serve her sentence as mandated by the court; when she is
eligible for release from state custody, ICE is notified to take
her into custody under a 48-hour maximum detainer.72 An
immigration detainer (Form I-247) is a request from ICE for
local law enforcement to temporarily hold an immigrant pend-
ing an immigration proceeding or removal.
At this point, removal proceedings may occur: only an
immigration court can issue an order for removal from the
United States.73 An immigration court will compare the crime
the individual has been convicted of with the relevant federal
criminal act, according to the references in the Immigration
and Nationality Act. The court will apply either a categorical
or a modified categorical approach (discussed in subsection C,
below) to determine whether the crime the immigrant has
been convicted of matches the statutory requirements under
federal law that are identified in the INA. If it does, and the
immigrant does not qualify for various forms of relief under
immigration law, the immigration judge may issue an order of
removal or allow the immigrant to leave the country on her
own under “voluntary departure.”74
B. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
PROVISIONS REGARDING CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Section 237(a)(2) of the INA outlines various criminal
offenses that make an alien removable in broad categories,
including crimes involving moral turpitude, aggravated
felonies, and other miscellaneous offenses, each of which is
discussed in this subsection.75 These specific offenses make an
immigrant removable under the procedure outlined in subsec-
tion II.A., above. To determine whether a state criminal con-
viction qualifies as a removable offense under federal law, an
immigration judge compares the elements of the state statute
with the generic federal definitions: an immigration judge
looks at the “‘ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning’
of the [criminal] term [indicated by the INA] by looking to the
common law, the contemporary meaning of the term as
expressed in state and federal law, and other respected sources
such as the Model Penal Code.”76 This immigration-court
determination compares state and federal criminal statutes to
ascertain the purpose and scope of removability under the
INA.
In outlining the qualifying crimes that result in removabil-
ity, the INA makes distinctions between the “term of impris-
onment,” “sentence,” and potential sentence that is imposed
on a criminal defendant. A term of imprisonment is defined by
the INA as “the period of incarceration or confinement ordered
by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposi-
tion or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or
in part.”77 This term includes any detention time and the
entirety of the sentence imposed. “Sentence” is used for the
same definition and includes what is ordered by the court
without respect to actual time served by the noncitizen.78 Con-
versely, certain INA provisions condition a removable offense
on the maximum potential sentence available for the crime
under state law.79 Other removable offenses are conditioned on
the time the crime is committed80 or financial minimums of
the crime.81
The subsections of INA 237(a)(2) detail the various other
criminal offenses that result in removal from the United States:
controlled-substance offenses, other than a single offense of
personal possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana;82 convic-
tions that show the immigrant is a drug abuser or addict;83 pos-
session or sale of unlawful firearms or destructive devices;84
crimes related to espionage, sabotage, treason, or sedition;85
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domestic violence, stalking, criminal child abuse, child
neglect, or child abandonment;86 violation of a protection
order related to domestic violence;87 and human trafficking.88
Some alternative qualifications for removability in the INA
are also crimes, even when they are not codified under Section
237(a)(2) of the Act. For example, an immigrant who is pre-
sent in the United States without lawful admission (someone
who has “entered without inspection”) is in violation of the
law but is removable according to Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the
INA.89 Entering into a marriage for the fraudulent purposes of
obtaining immigration benefits90 and document fraud91 are
also crimes located in other subsections of INA Section 237.
However, Section 237(a)(2) of the INA is the proper scope for
trial court judges: this section includes the circumstances
where the conviction of a noncitizen in a criminal court may
be reviewed by an immigration judge for removability. The var-
ious other removable offenses in the INA are generally litigated
only in immigration courts, even when they are also crimes
under federal law.
1. Federal Immigration Definition of “Aggravated
Felony”
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA makes immigrants that
have been convicted of an aggravated felony removable.92
“Aggravated felony” as an immigration-specific term refers to a
broad class of crimes in federal immigration law, defined in
Section 101(a)(43) of the Act.93 This broad category includes,
among others, murder, rape, theft, crimes of violence against a
person or property, domestic abuse, stalking, trafficking in
drugs or persons, fraud, child pornography, and false docu-
ments.94 Several of these aggravated-felony crimes require that
a “term of imprisonment of at least one year” may be imposed
or set certain minimums for crimes to qualify (such as
“amount of the funds exceeded $10,000.”)95
3. Federal Immigration Definition of “Crimes Involving
Moral Turpitude”
There is no definition of a “crime involving moral turpi-
tude” (CIMT) in the Immigration and Nationality Act or other
federal laws.96 Therefore, the definition of such a crime must
be assessed through judicial interpretation by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.97 A CIMT, defined generally, is one “that
shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or
depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed
between persons, either to individuals or society in general.”98
Such a crime “must involve evil or malicious intent or inher-
ent depravity.”99 “Neither the seriousness of the crime nor the
severity of the sentence is determinative of whether a crime is
a crime of moral turpitude.”100 Determining whether a crime
involves moral turpitude requires an examination of the ele-
ments of the crime under a categorical or modified categorical
approach as described in subsection C, below.101 The determi-
nation of construction is driven “by the statutory definition or
by the nature of the crime not by the specific conduct that
resulted in the conviction.”102
Some common examples of crimes involving moral turpi-
tude include: “crime[s] involving intent or reckless behavior to
commit great bodily harm . . . crimes involving an intent to
defraud [theft, fraud, perjury] . . . prostitution . . . [and] money
laundering.”103 A simple case of driving under the influence
(DUI) is not a CIMT, but committing a DUI while knowingly
driving on a license previously revoked for a different DUI is a
CIMT.104 Assault may be a CIMT but only if there is an aggra-
vating factor that is charged.105
C. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN 
IMMIGRATION LAW
Following a criminal conviction by a trial court judge, an
immigration judge must determine whether a noncitizen is
removable by comparing her conviction under state law with
the applicable federal law described in the INA. This process of
statutory construction only involves the immigration courts,
but understanding the process may benefit trial judges by
demonstrating the full consequences of a conviction that is
imposed in criminal court. To determine whether a conviction
renders an immigrant removable, the immigration judge uses
either a categorical or modified categorical approach. A cate-
gorical approach requires that “the judge must determine if
there is a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility that
the criminal statute would be applied to reach [removable]
conduct.”106 This categorical approach requires that the full
range of the criminal statute under which an immigrant is con-
victed yields a removable offense under federal law. Therefore,
vague or overbroad statutes that include conduct that does not
result in removability under relevant federal law does not yield
immigration consequences. A modified categorical approach
allows the reviewing immigration judge to conduct a limited
examination of the record to determine whether the elements
202 Court Review - Volume 50 
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
110. Id. at 1–2.
111. Id. at 22–23.
112. Id.
113. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
114. NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT, MONCRIEFFE V. HOLDER: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR DRUG CHARGES AND OTHER ISSUES INVOLVING THE CATE-
GORICAL APPROACH (2013), available at http://www.national
immigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice_advisories/pa_
Moncrieffe%20v.%20Holder%205-2-13.pdf.
115. WASHINGTON DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION’S IMMIGRATION PROJECT, ANA-
LYZING WASHINGTON GENERAL ASSAULT CONVICTIONS AFTER MON-
CRIEFFE, DESCAMPS, AND OLIVAS-MOTTA: AN OVERVIEW GUIDE FOR
IMMIGRATION COUNSEL 2 (2013), available at
http://www.defensenet.org/immigration-project/immigration-
resources/moncrieffe-descamps-analysis-for-immigration-
a t to rneys /AILA-WA%20Pos t%20Moncr i e f f e%20%20
Descamps%20Assault%20Crimes%20Advisory%20%208-1-
13.pdf/view [hereinafter GENERAL ASSAULT CONVICTIONS AFTER
MONCRIEFFE, DESCAMPS, AND OLIVAS-MOTTA].
116. Id. at 3.
of the state crime demonstrate removability.107 The limited
examination of the record of conviction may include “docu-
ments such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury
instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript.”108
A series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court in
summer 2013 clarified the approach to rules of construction
regarding criminal convictions that carry immigration conse-
quences. Descamps v. United States involved a criminal case
where the defendant, Descamps, was convicted in 1978 for the
burglary of a grocery store.109 The 1978 conviction was under
a state statute that did not include unlawful entry as an ele-
ment of the crime. This charge was the defendant’s third vio-
lent felony in violation of the federal Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA), which imposes an enhanced conviction on the
defendant; however, the language of the ACCA includes
“unlawful entry” as an element of the crime.110 This presented
the question of whether the 1978 conviction could qualify
under the ACCA, which would require a modified categorical
approach to examine the facts of the 1978 conviction. The
Ninth Circuit found this element of the 1978 conviction satis-
fied by Descamps’s plea bargain; however, the United States
Supreme Court disagreed and reversed Descamps’s enhanced
conviction under ACCA.111 In her opinion, Justice Kagan
stated that the modified categorical approach is inapplicable to
a statute such as the ACCA, which contains a single, indivisi-
ble set of elements.112
The United States Supreme Court held in Moncrieffe v.
Holder that the traditional categorical approach to statutory
construction applies under a Georgia statute for marijuana
possession with intent to distribute.113 This result was due to
the mismatch of the Georgia statute to federal law under a cat-
egorical approach: the Georgia statute covers some criminal
conduct that falls outside the aggravated felony definition at
federal law, which carries immigration consequences.114 This
case reaffirms the court’s traditional reliance on the categorical
approach when comparing convictions under state criminal
statutes to applicable federal law.
Descamps and Moncrieffe assert a specific framework for
immigration judges in constructing statutes to determine
whether they match the general federal definition of a particu-
lar crime and can result in removal from the United States. The
initial step is always to use the categorical approach, some-
times known as the “minimum conduct” test: “does the mini-
mum conduct necessary to violate the statute match the
generic immigration definition at issue?”115 If the answer is no,
the modified categorical approach may be used but is restricted
to divisible statutes: it “is reserved only for statutes which set
forth multiple, separately defined offenses, one of which would
trigger the generic immigration definition.”116 Taken together,
the court’s holdings in Descamps and Moncrieffe can be con-
ceptualized as a three-part test. The following graphic repre-
sents the test that immigration judges engage in to determine
removability, which is further explained in subsections 1–3.
1. Step 1: Apply the Categorical Approach
Under both Descamps and Moncrieffe, the traditional categorical
approach is the first step of analysis. There must be a definitive
categorical match—the state criminal offense the immigrant
was convicted under must necessarily involve all the facts
required by the generic definition at federal law—for a statute
to qualify under the generic federal immigration definition.
2. Step 2: Determine Whether the Statute Is Divisible
If there is no definitive categorical match, the next step in the
analysis is to determine whether the statute of conviction is
divisible; that is, whether the statute contains one or more
offense in the alternative that a defendant may be charged
under. A keyword to identify such a statute is language such as
“or” (as in, “consuming alcohol or drugs”). An indivisible
statute is one that includes different elements an immigrant
could be convicted under but which cannot be separated under
the statute. Indivisible statutes often have general terms (e.g.,
“weapon”) instead of specific terms to differentiate offenses
(e.g., “knife or gun”).
Court Review - Volume 50 203
117. JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 19, at 22 (Jurisdictions that have
a statutory obligation for advising immigrant criminal defendants
include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Puerto Rico,
Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.)
118. See generally supra Section I.
119. See supra Section I.B.3.a.
120. BENCH GUIDE, supra note 73, at 9.
121. Matter of Victor Ramon Velazquez-Herrara, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503
Interim Decision 3610 (BIA 2008).
3. Step 3: If the Statute Is Indivisible, There Is No
Match, and the Defendant Is Not Removable. If the
Statute Is Divisible, Apply a Modified Categorical
Approach.
If the statute is indivisible, there is no match for the state
statute to federal law: the conviction cannot carry immigration
consequences because it is overbroad and includes conduct that
could reach nonremovable crimes. If the statute is divisible, the
immigration court may conduct a very limited modified cate-
gorical approach, including an examination of the record of
conviction by a trial court. The United States Supreme Court is
explicit that reviewing courts may not examine specific facts or
evidence in the record, even under a modified categorical
approach; instead, immigration courts may look at pleadings,
sentencing, and other limited records by the trial court.
III. CURRENT STATUTORY APPROACHES FOR ADVISING
NONCITIZEN CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN A TRIAL
COURT
Section I demonstrated the ambiguity of judges’ affirmative
duties with respect to noncitizen criminal defendants follow-
ing Padilla. Section II outlined the black letter federal law
regarding removal of noncitizens in criminal-conviction con-
texts. In this section, we discuss current statutory obligations
on trial court judges regarding informing noncitizen defen-
dants of potential removal consequences of convictions.
Although such advisements may not be explicitly required by
Padilla, the U.S. Constitution, or state constitutions, certain
jurisdictions have chosen to affirmatively require various types
of advisements to noncitizen criminal defendants.
A. CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPROACHING STATUTORY
ADVISEMENTS
There is currently some form of statutory judicial advisement
for immigrant criminal defendants in at least 28 jurisdictions.117
These statutory obligations impose different models of compli-
ance with Padilla and subsequent decisions, along with ethical
obligations imposed on judges.118 This section discusses a sam-
pling of five statutory obligations imposed on judges—from Cal-
ifornia, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and
Connecticut—representing a variety of alternatives that courts
have adopted to address the complicated issue of ensuring a
criminal immigrant defendant understands her rights regarding
the intersection of criminal and immigration law.
When evaluating potential approaches to statutory obliga-
tions on a trial court, it is important to consider certain factors
that impact how effective an advisement is. First, the immi-
grant criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and Sixth Amendment due-process rights
should be protected under Padilla.119 There are also various
positive and negative consequences to different models of
advisement. Boilerplate language is easily administered and
broad, but it is also vague and potentially misunderstood by a
defendant. Allowing a defendant additional time to consider
her plea in light of the advisement ensures that she under-
stands potential immigration consequences, but it is poten-
tially inefficient for the trial court by opening it up to delay tac-
tics by defense counsel. Placing the burden on the defendant to
move to vacate a judgment if her advisement is insufficient
allows for efficiency in the court and allows a defendant a typ-
ical defense through criminal proceedings, but immigrant
defendants unfamiliar with English or the American judicial
system may be unaware of these rights. The trial court should
always balance efficiency for the judicial system against
stronger protections for defendants and should consider
unique issues facing immigrant defendants (such as language
barriers, unfamiliarity with the legal system, disparate educa-
tion levels, and fear of removal). In evaluating the proper
approach, a trial court should employ the strongest practical
protections from noncitizen defendants to ensure they fully
understand the potential consequences in immigration court.
Concerns regarding whether trial court judges are able to
consider immigration consequences in convictions and sen-
tencing have been clarified in part by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA).  “[I]mmigration courts must determine
immigration consequences to an [immigrant] based on the
crime as charged and convicted and the sentence as deter-
mined by the state court judge, even if the criminal charge or
sentence was shaped by the prosecutor or judge in part to mit-
igate or maximize adverse immigration consequences on the
defendant.”120 The immigration judge will consider the sen-
tence and conviction, without regard to a trial court judge’s
consideration of immigration consequences, even when a
conviction is retroactively modified to alter immigration con-
sequences.121 These decisions by the BIA make it clear that a
trial court judge has the discretion to consider federal immi-
gration consequences of a conviction, and a judge should
accordingly be aware of and prevent unduly adverse conse-
quences that might arise from conviction.
B. STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS: FIVE EXAMPLES
This subsection will illustrate five of the current approaches
taken by legislatures in various jurisdictions to impose some
obligation on the court to inform noncitizen defendants of
potential immigration consequences from a criminal convic-
tion. Each model trial-court advisement serves as an exemplar
for a specific category of statutes. The statutes are quoted in
part to highlight their differences; some provisions have simi-
lar language and impact in their full text, but the purpose of
this illustration is to demonstrate the various individual provi-
sions used by trial courts. Following this chart is a substantive
discussion of the model advisements.
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It is important to note that these statutory duties create
mandatory minimums for courts. Individual courts or jurisdic-
tions may be permitted—depending on statutory language—to
provide additional protections for criminal defendants by
internal rules and procedures. For example, the Superior
Court of California, County of San Diego, provides more
detailed explanations of potential immigration consequences
on its plea form than is required by the California statute,
including a list of aggravated felonies under federal immigra-
tion law.122
1. Sample Policy #1: Broad Language (California)123
The court shall administer the following advisement on the
record to the defendant: If you are not a citizen, you are
hereby advised that conviction of the offense for which you
have been charged may have the consequences of deporta-
tion, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial
of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.
California was the first state to impose an obligation to
ensure effective assistance of counsel and inform immigrant
criminal defendants of potential immigration consequences.
The statutory language has been very influential and has been
repeated in other state statutes, including the District of
Columbia and Massachusetts (Model Advisements #2 and #3).
This language offers criminal defendants a quick summation of
the fact that there may be immigration consequences but is
standard language applied broadly to every defendant. While
this is a highly efficient option, this model alone does not offer
any protection to a noncitizen criminal defendant, nor does it
ensure any sort of informed plea that includes a full under-
standing of potential immigration consequences of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere. Taken alone, this language is inade-
quate to meet the needs of immigrant defendants and does
nothing to prevent claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
under Padilla.
MODEL ADVISEMENTS RELEVANT STATUTORY LANGUAGE EFFECT OF THE LANGUAGE
BROAD LANGUAGE
(CALIFORNIA)
The court shall administer the following advisement
on the record to the defendant: If you are not a citi-
zen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the
offense for which you have been charged may have
the consequences of deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States, or denial of natural-
ization pursuant to the laws of the United States.
This boilerplate language informs a defendant in the
most general manner that there may be potential




Upon request, the court shall allow the defendant a
reasonable amount of additional time to consider the
appropriateness of the plea in light of advisement.
This statutory language allows the defendant to con-
sult with her attorney if she has not already, to deter-
mine what immigration effects may result from a con-
viction.
STATUTORY CONSEQUENCES FROM A
TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO INFORM
(MASSACHUSETTS)
If the court fails so to advise the defendant, and he
later at any time shows that his plea and conviction
may have or has had one of the enumerated conse-
quences, even if the defendant has already been
deported from the United States, the court, on the
defendant’s motion, shall vacate the judgment, and
permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty,
plea of nolo contendere, or admission of sufficient
facts, and enter a plea of not guilty . . . .
If a trial court does not inform a criminal defendant
of potential immigration consequences, the court is
mandated to vacate the conviction and allow a new
plea to be entered if the defendant so moves. 
ENGAGING WITH THE DEFENDANT AND
HER COUNSEL
(MINNESOTA)
The judge must also ensure defense counsel has told
the defendant and the defendant understands: . . .
That if the defendant is not a citizen of the United
States, a plea of guilty to the crime charged may result
in deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization as a United
States citizen. 
This statutory provision mandates that courts verify
that defense counsel has done her duty under Padilla





The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere from any defendant in any criminal pro-
ceeding unless the court first addresses the defendant
personally and determines that the defendant fully
understands that if the defendant is not a citizen of
the United States, conviction of the offense for which
the defendant has been charged may have the conse-
quences of deportation or removal from the United
States, exclusion from readmission to the United
States or denial of naturalization . . . .
This provision mandates that a court must ensure a
defendant knows about potential immigration conse-
quences that may arise from a conviction. The burden
is on the court to ensure that this has been done.
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2. Sample Policy #2: Additional Time in Plea 
Colloquies (District of Columbia)124
Upon request, the court shall allow the defendant a reason-
able amount of additional time to consider the appropriate-
ness of the plea in light of advisement.
The District of Columbia has adopted California’s statutory
language in subsection (a) of its judicial obligation.125 Addi-
tionally, D.C. courts allow a “reasonable amount of additional
time to consider the appropriateness of the plea in light of
advisement.”126 This statutory language provides additional
protection for the immigrant criminal defendant by allowing
sufficient time to make an informed plea. The additional time
for the defendant to consider her plea after the advisement may
open the court to delay tactics and the potential for lengthy
continuances in some cases. However, limiting this to “reason-
able” additional time prevents improper delays. This type of
advisement should be used by courts to safeguard against inef-
fective counsel: allowing additional time to consider a plea, if
needed, further encourages defense counsel to fully inform her
client of immigration consequences.
3. Sample Policy #3: Statutory Consequences from a
Trial Court’s Failure to Inform (Massachusetts)127
If the court fails so to advise the defendant, and he later at
any time shows that his plea and conviction may have or
has had one of the enumerated consequences, even if the
defendant has already been deported from the United
States, the court, on the defendant’s motion, shall vacate the
judgment, and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of
guilty, plea of nolo contendere, or admission of sufficient
facts, and enter a plea of not guilty . . . .
Massachusetts statutory language creates specific conse-
quences if a court fails to inform a noncitizen criminal defen-
dant of the potential for immigration consequences upon con-
viction: the court will vacate the judgment upon defendant’s
motion and allow her to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere. This sample advisement really conveys a consequence
and demonstrates the process a court will take in the absence
of a full advisement. The language provides a clear path for the
court to take if it fails to inform a noncitizen defendant. How-
ever, this consequence is only available upon the defendant’s
motion: noncitizen defendants, especially ones unfamiliar with
the American legal system, who may not speak English as a
first language, or who have deficient counsel, may go unaware
of this potential to vacate their judgment and enter a new plea.
The extended language of this statute also offers additional
protection to an immigrant criminal defendant by protecting
her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination: she
“shall not be required . . . to disclose to the court [her] legal
status in the United States” at any time.128 This statutory pro-
tection is essential protection for a noncitizen defendant
against revealing her immigration status.
SAMPLE POLICIES BENEFITS TO THE DEFENDANT BENEFITS TO THE COURT
BROAD LANGUAGE
(CALIFORNIA)
The defendant will be aware of the possibility of
immigration consequences of a conviction.
This is efficient for a court: the trial court judge reads
the statement for each defendant, regardless of immi-
gration status. There is no duty to do anything more




This allows a defendant and her counsel to have the
necessary time to make an informed plea decision to
avoid adverse immigration consequences.
While there exists a potential for delay tactics, this
may be efficient for the court over time by reducing
potential claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
under Padilla.
STATUTORY CONSEQUENCES FROM A
TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO INFORM
(MASSACHUSETTS)
This protects a defendant by creating statutory conse-
quences for the failure by a trial court to inform a
defendant of her potential immigration conse-
quences.
This language provides a clear statutory result of a
failure to inform a defendant. This encourages com-
pliance with the statute, and a statutory basis for
vacating a judgment upon failure to inform.
ENGAGING WITH THE DEFENDANT AND
HER COUNSEL
(MINNESOTA)
This requires that the defendant is not only informed
of, but also understands, the potential immigration
consequences of a conviction.
By engaging with defense counsel and the defendant,
personally, the trial court judge creates a clear record
that the defendant knows and understands immigra-




A guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere will not be
accepted by the trial court without an affirmative
showing that the defendant knows about potential
immigration consequences.
This protects against uninformed pleas. This places a
burden on the court to show that it has verified a
defendant’s understanding of potential immigration
consequences, further encouraging judicial compli-
ance with the statutory obligation to inform a defen-
dant.
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133. We contacted the offices of the state courts in six jurisdictions
that have a statutory obligation for trial court judges to inquire
about the effectiveness of their statutory advisement. The juris-
dictions we contacted included the five discussed in our model
advisements above (California, District of Columbia, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, and Connecticut) and Iowa. Our research plan
was to contact the administrative offices and ask the following
five questions:
1. How has Padilla v. Kentucky affected or influenced how
your state’s guidelines about noncitizen defendants have
been implemented?
2. Has your court seen very many Padilla claims on appeal
(anecdotally)?
3. Do you think your state’s statutory language about
advisements is adequate following Padilla? If not, what
changes should be made to it?
4. Do you keep any data on the number of Padilla claims?
5. How do you think judges feel about the statutory advise-
ment and the Padilla decision generally?
Each of the offices of our model advisements communicated a lack of
understanding that there was a statutory obligation imposed on trial
court judges, and nobody was clear who would be able to answer our
questions. Ultimately, most were unable or unwilling to answer any of
our questions. We received one reply from the Communications Offi-
cer of the Iowa Judicial Branch, who informed us that the state keeps
no data on Padilla claims and, because the state’s judicial advisement
(Iowa Rule of Crim. Procedure 2.8(2)(b)(3) (2002)) predates Padilla,
Iowa courts have not seen any significant changes since the Supreme
Court decision.
4. Sample Policy #4: Engaging with the Defendant
and Her Counsel (Minnesota)129
The judge must also ensure defense counsel has told the
defendant and the defendant understands: . . . That if the
defendant is not a citizen of the United States, a plea of
guilty to the crime charged may result in deportation, exclu-
sion from admission to the United States, or denial of natu-
ralization as a United States citizen. 
Minnesota imposes an obligation to engage with both the
criminal defendant and her counsel to ensure that the defen-
dant understands potential consequences of a conviction. This
judicial obligation protects the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
due-process rights but is silent on her Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. While it offers a strong addition to
the repertoire of potential advisements by ensuring that a
defendant understands her potential consequences, this falls
short by omitting from statutory language that the court
should not inquire into a defendant’s citizenship status. The
statutory language appears to only apply to noncitizen defen-
dants; unless such a statutory scheme is applied to every crim-
inal defendant regardless of citizenship status, this may pres-
sure a noncitizen to divulge her status or feel she must keep it
secret, even from her lawyer. A judicial advisement should not
place this uncertainty on a noncitizen defendant or in any way
deter client-attorney communication.
5. Sample Policy #5: Imposing a Burden on the Court
(Connecticut)130
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere from any defendant in any criminal proceeding
unless the court first addresses the defendant personally and
determines that the defendant fully understands that if the
defendant is not a citizen of the United States, conviction of
the offense for which the defendant has been charged may
have the consequences of deportation or removal from the
United States, exclusion from readmission to the United
States or denial of naturalization . . . .
The Connecticut statute regarding Padilla advisement goes
the furthest of the state statutes to impose a burden on the
court to determine whether the defendant understands the
possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea or a plea of
nolo contendere.131 The full statute provides many of the pro-
tections other courts have imposed (additional time to con-
sider a plea, Fifth Amendment protection from disclosing her
legal status in the United States, and the ability to withdraw
her plea if the court fails its obligation) but goes a step further
to impose the burden on the court to not accept a guilty plea
or plea of nolo contendere until the court addresses the defen-
dant and determines that she “fully understands” potential
immigration consequences. This requires that a trial court
judge ensure the defendant has effective assistance of counsel,
potentially eliminating the need for a Padilla claim if done
properly and consistently. However, the language also imposes
a three-year statute of limitations on the defendant if she qual-
ifies to withdraw a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere.132
This limits the opportunity for noncitizen defendants to take
advantage of their rights under Padilla if they do not take affir-
mative action before the tolling of the statute of limitations,
which could negatively affect the very noncitizen defendants
the statute seeks to protect if they are unaware of their rights
and have ineffective defense counsel.
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT STATUTORY
OBLIGATIONS
It is apparent that trial court judges’ statutory obligations to
inform noncitizen criminal defendants of potential immigra-
tion consequences during proceedings is not widely under-
stood, even by the courts themselves. After an unsuccessful
survey133 of the courts in various jurisdictions, we have con-
cluded that statutory obligations must better serve their pur-
pose in their respective jurisdictions: education regarding
potential immigration consequences from criminal convictions
should be made available not only to trial court judges, but
also to court administrators. This readily available information
would be valuable to various parties: criminal defendants, who
may be directly affected by an advisement; criminal lawyers,
who may not have a background in immigration law; individ-
ual judges, who may need clarification of their judicial obliga-
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tions; and court administrators, to verify that each court is ful-
filling its statutory obligations.
IV. PROPOSED MODEL ADVISEMENT
It is our recommendation that a trial court should use the
following model advisement for every criminal defendant each
time she appears before the court, including before accepting a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere:
This court will not inquire into your citizenship status dur-
ing this criminal proceeding. You should know, however,
that if you are not a citizen of the United States, a criminal
conviction may have adverse immigration consequences,
such as removal from the United States or ineligibility for
certain forms of immigration benefits or relief. A conviction
in this court may also affect your immigration status and
the ability for you to travel to other countries, depending on
their respective immigration laws and policies.
If you do not understand or have had insufficient time to
consult with your attorney regarding your immigration sta-
tus and the potential consequences of a conviction, the court
shall grant you reasonable additional time to consult pri-
vately and confidentially with your attorney. Have you had
sufficient time to consult with your attorney regarding your
immigration status and the potential consequences of a con-
viction? Do you fully understand the potential immigration
consequences of a conviction, if applicable? Counsel, can
you verify that you have discussed the potential immigra-
tion consequences of a guilty plea with your client?
This court will not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
without first confirming that you have had the opportunity
to consult with your attorney regarding your immigration
status and the potential consequences of a criminal convic-
tion. If the court fails to verify that you are aware and
understand the potential consequences of your conviction,
the court shall, on the defendant’s motion, vacate the judg-
ment and permit you to withdraw your plea and enter a
plea of not guilty.
A. PROVISIONS OF THE MODEL ADVISEMENT
Our proposed model advisement for trial court judges
should apply to all criminal defendants, regardless of whether
they are noncitizens. A judge should not inquire into a defen-
dant’s citizenship status, nor should a defendant ever feel pres-
sured to reveal her status to the trial court. This initial state-
ment of the proposed advisement will protect the defendant’s
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and make it
clear there should be no pressure to divulge immigration sta-
tus to the trial court.134 To effectively ensure against self-
incrimination, this advisement should be given to all criminal
defendants at every hearing. 
The proposed advisement allows a defendant additional
time to consider her plea in light of potential immigration con-
sequences that result from a criminal conviction (including a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere) if she has not consulted with
her attorney or does not fully understand the potential conse-
quences of a plea. This additional time should be reasonable
under the circumstances of the case, and the length of the addi-
tional time should be discretionary.135 It is essential to remem-
ber when deciding the reasonable length of additional time to
consider a plea that, despite the severity under criminal law, a
conviction may carry more severe consequences—including
removal—in immigration law.136
The advisement engages with both the defendant and her
defense counsel to verify that she fully understands the poten-
tial consequences of a conviction and that her counsel has ade-
quately informed her. This places an affirmative duty on the
defense counsel to fulfill its obligations under Padilla while
allowing the court to safeguard against ineffective assistance.
The questions directed at the defendant and her counsel
encourage them both to listen to and understand the advise-
ment in its totality and creates a record that the court
attempted to ensure proper representation by the defense
counsel under Padilla.
Further, this advisement places a burden on the court to
ensure that it does not accept a plea until it verifies that a
defendant understands the potential immigration conse-
quences.137 If the record is silent regarding judicial advisement,
there should be a presumption that the court has not properly
informed the defendant, and the judgment should be vacated
upon defendant’s motion. There should be no statute of limita-
tions on the defendant’s right to move to vacate the judgment
if there has been no effective judicial advisement: noncitizen
defendants who do not fully understand the potential immi-
gration consequences should be able to effectively navigate the
trial court system and take full advantage of their protections
under the law. This final paragraph in the advisement could
alternatively be adopted as a model principle: instead of advis-
ing each criminal defendant of the process, the trial court may
instead adopt the purpose of the confirmation in practice and
allow the defendant additional time to confer with her lawyer
if necessary.
To ensure the defendant’s protection, this advisement
should be given every time a defendant appears before the
court. In preliminary hearings, the advisement will direct the
defense counsel to consult with her client before entering a
plea. During a plea colloquy, it will ensure that proper repre-
sentation has occurred before entering a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere. During sentencing, such a statement will remind a
defendant of potential consequences and her ability to raise a
claim under Padilla if she has not been effectively represented
or, alternatively, to move to vacate the judgment by the court
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and enter a new plea of not guilty if the court has not previ-
ously informed her.
B. WHAT SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE MODEL
ADVISEMENT
We did not include examples of specific crimes as a provi-
sion of the model advisement. For example, an advisement
could potentially inform a criminal defendant: “Some common
crimes that carry immigration consequences include drug offenses,
theft, assault, and battery.” Alternatively, as the Superior Court
of California, County of San Diego, has done, courts could pro-
vide plea forms that include specific aggravated felonies that
are removable offenses.138 Although including common crimes
as examples of removable offenses, such as drug possession or
crimes involving moral turpitude, would more effectively
inform a defendant of potential immigration consequences
specific to her offense, it is likely that such an advisement
could have a negative—and improper—effect in immigration
court. If it becomes necessary for an immigration judge to use
a modified categorical approach to determine removability, the
immigration judge will have access to limited records of con-
viction, including the judicial advisement. If the immigration
judge reads the specific crime in the advisement without the
context of the case, she may rule a noncitizen is removable in
circumstances where a silent record would not result in
removal. For example, signaling “drug offenses” as a remov-
able offense may lead an immigration court to conclude that an
immigrant is removable on a modified categorical approach for
a divisible statute, even when the charge is only for simple per-
sonal possession of marijuana under 30 grams (which is not a
removable offense).139 Additionally, where crimes involving
moral turpitude are unclear under the federal definition,
crime-specific advisements may lead to improper removal: if
the advisement signals removability, this may lead an immigra-
tion judge to incorrectly conclude removability where the ele-
ments of the potential CIMT are unclear at federal law.140 Stat-
ing specific examples of removable offenses in a judicial
advisement would ultimately be counterproductive and result
in increased removal of convicted noncitizens in circumstances
where they may otherwise be permitted to remain in the
United States. It may be possible to avoid these consequences
with careful consideration of what to include on a plea form or
in an oral judicial advisement, but this determination should
be made by individual jurisdictions; our model proposal is
meant to provide adequate protections for noncitizen criminal
defendants in any jurisdiction and may be modified to become
more effective in specific jurisdictions.
C. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE TRIAL
COURT
We recommend that trial courts without statutory obliga-
tions adopt our proposed model advisement to effectively
allow noncitizen criminal defendants to assert their rights
under Padilla. To maximize the utility of the judicial advise-
ment, the court should apply the effect retroactively by court
precedent. This would allow a noncitizen previously unpro-
tected by such an advisement to assert her rights under Padilla,
vacate her judgment and enter a plea of not guilty, and maxi-
mize her rights under the law, even if she has already been
removed following a conviction in a criminal proceeding.
Even if a state legislature has not created a judicial duty that
requires an advisement, courts should adopt some form of this
proposed advisement to ensure that all defendants are aware of
potential immigration consequences from conviction. Trial
courts in jurisdictions that already have statutory obligations
to advise noncitizen defendants should take steps to further
maximize their advisement’s utility by incorporating our
model language and ensuring that all defendants’ rights are
sufficiently protected.
CONCLUSION
Trial court judges have always played a crucial role in safe-
guarding criminal defendants’ due-process rights, such as
access to effective assistance of counsel and the ability to make
knowing, intelligent pleas. Through the Padilla decision, the
United States Supreme Court has now expressed an interest in
protecting the unique interests of noncitizens appearing in
state and federal criminal proceedings. The Padilla decision
applies directly to defense attorneys, but we have demon-
strated the benefits when trial court judges also adopt proce-
dures to uphold the rights of noncitizen criminal defendants.
This is best illustrated by our recommended model advisement
in section IV. We recommend that all trial court judges become
familiar with the relevant immigration consequences that
come from criminal convictions as stated in the INA, discussed
in section III, and employ an advisement to inform noncitizens
of their rights and the potential immigration consequences of
their criminal convictions.
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